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The Fourth Amendment of our Constitution provides a safeguard for U.S. citizens against
government intrusion by barring “unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 The Supreme Court,
however, has faced significant difficulty in consistently determining what government actions
are “unreasonable” and what actions constitute a “search” or “seizure.” The Court’s enduring
problems have led several legal scholars to criticize the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as “famously zigzagging,”2 and creating a legal framework that is riddled with
inconsistency and incoherence.3 As a result, many in the legal community have acknowledged
that Fourth Amendment doctrine is in a state of theoretical chaos.4 This is especially true
regarding the Court's approach to Internet surveillance. An analysis of the Fourth Amendment
doctrine over the years leads to the inevitable conclusion that case law and federal legislation are
currently ill-equipped to address Internet privacy rights.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Fourth Amendment played a minor
role in search and seizure cases.5 One of the Court’s earliest decisions held that the “contents” of
letters and sealed packages were “fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to
their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their
domiciles.”6 What limited role it did play early on, the Supreme Court's early Fourth
Amendment doctrine strictly construed the amendment to protect only against the government's
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6
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 728 (1877).
1

1

physical trespasses onto a citizen's property, the warrantless search of tangible personal property,
or the warrantless seizure of the person.7 The National Prohibition Act of 1919, however, led to
an exponential increase in the number of federal prosecutions.8 Consequently, the resulting use
of telephone wiretaps by federal investigators led to constitutional challenges to federal searches.
United States v Olmstead epitomizes the Supreme Court's early Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 9 In Olmstead, the defendant Roy Olmstead sought to suppress, as a
constitutionally impermissible search, recordings of conversations obtained by the police after a
lengthy months-long wiretap of his home and office telephone lines.10 The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee of a right to be secure in one's “persons, houses, papers, and
effects” only provided protection against searches and seizures of “tangible things.”11 Under this
rationale, the Court found that a wiretap was not a Fourth Amendment search so long as the
government did not “physically penetrate the houses or offices of the defendants” in placing the
wiretap.12 Consequently, the majority concluded that the wiretap was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment for two primary reasons: 1) there was no physical invasion of a
constitutionally protected area as there was no physical trespass onto Olmstead's real property
and 2) there was no search of a tangible item as the wiretap searched only intangible sound.13

In his dissent, Justice Brandeis cautioned the Court in Olmstead that it was their duty to
develop and adapt the Fourth Amendment in such a way as to guard against, not only means of
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government intrusion then known, but also “what may be” in the future.14 Brandeis further
predicted that the technology of government intrusion into the private lives of its citizens would
not stop with the advent of wiretapping,15 but would extend to “the most intimate occurrences of
the home” without even “removing papers from secret drawers.16
Justice’s Brandeis’ “right to be let alone” philosophy in Olmstead did not immediately
catch on.17 Over the next four decades, the Court continued to adhere to its physical intrusion
requirement enunciated in Olmstead. For instance, in Goldman vs United States, the Court held
that the government did not trigger Fourth Amendment coverage by placing a listening device
against an outer wall of a building and listening to private conversations within.18 The Court
continued to rely on Olmstead in Silverman v United States and Clinton v Virginia. In both of
those holdings, the Court reasoned that physical intrusion by the government was required for a
petitioner to seek Fourth Amendment protection.19 It was becoming clear, however, that the
Court’s physical trespass-based test was being manipulated by the government’s new and
innovative wiretapping techniques. In Clinton v Virginia, for example, the government attached
a listening device using means that merely causing a thumbtack sized penetration in a wall.
Olmstead’s rule barely survived in that case, but the Court did conclude that the minuscule
physical intrusion constituted a “search” within a meaning of the Fourth Amendment.20
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With it becoming easier for the Government to listen in on conversations without
physically trespassing onto a person’s property, the Court and the legal community were
becoming concerned that nothing would soon be left of Fourth Amendment protection. A new
privacy test was needed. In response to that need, the Court brought vitality back to the Fourth
Amendment in the revolutionary case of Katz v United States.

In Katz, the government was permitted at trial, over Katz’s objection, to introduce
evidence of Katz’s telephone calls overheard by FBI agents. Specifically, the FBI had attached a
bug to the outside of a public phone booth from which Katz made his calls. The Court of
Appeals, relying on the Olmstead trespass-based rule, affirmed the lower court ruling. On
appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed and found that the FBI’s bugging of the outside of
a phone booth constituted an unlawful search, thereby violating Katz’s Fourth Amendment
rights. The Court held that, through their warrantless search, the FBI violated “the privacy upon
which defendant [Katz] justifiably relied.”21 Justice Stewart, in delivering the majority opinion,
stated that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”22 The Court opined that what a
person seeks to preserve as private, regardless of his location, may be constitutionally protected
under the Fourth Amendment. By expanding the scope of the amendment, the Court departed
from the limiting and narrow view of Olmstead.23
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Olmstead, elaborated on the Court’s new Fourth
Amendment privacy standard. He explained that the phone booth in Katz was “an area where,
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like a home, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”24
Harlan commented that, in addition to a physical intrusion by the government, an “electronic”
intrusion could also constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.25 In establishing an
expectation of privacy threshold test, Harlan explained that for a person like Katz to seek Fourth
Amendment protection, he has the burden of satisfying a “twofold requirement.”26 Specifically,
for a person to show that the government violated his/her Fourth Amendment rights, that person
must, one, exhibit an subjective expectation of privacy (e.g. he seeks to preserve something as
private), and two, that person’s subjective expectation, viewed objectively, is justifiable under
the circumstances.27 Therefore, if both prongs of Harlan’s test are satisfied, then under Katz, a
person has Fourth Amendment protection and any invasion of that constitutionally protected area
is presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.28

Through its holding in Katz, the Court attempted to bring Fourth Amendment law into the
world of new technologies by introducing the reasonable expectation of privacy test.29 The
decision provided a long awaited opportunity for the Court to broaden Fourth Amendment
protection. Many descendant cases followed whose task was to develop, refine, and delimit the
boundaries of the privacy doctrine of Katz. One such case was Smith v Maryland30, through
which Justice Harlan’s expectation of privacy test was applied and, in turn, explained more
precisely.
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In Smith v Maryland, a harassment case, a woman reported to the police that not only was
she robbed by Smith, but was also receiving threatening phone calls from him thereafter. As part
of their investigation, the police installed a device (“pen register”) at a telephone company’s
central office to intercept the phone numbers dialed by Smith in an effort to determine if he was
in fact calling the complainant. As a result of utilizing the pen register, the police did find that
Smith made phone calls to the complainant and subsequently arrested him. Smith was later
convicted. After multiple appeals, the Supreme Court set out to determine whether the
government, like in Katz, infringed on Smith’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Using
Harlan’s twofold test, the Court held that the use of the pen register did not constitute a “search”
under the Fourth Amendment.31
The Smith Court concluded that, given the limited capabilities of the pen register (i.e.
only discloses phone numbers dialed and not conversations), Smith’s claim that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy must be rejected.32 Implementing Harlan’s test, the Court
found that people do not subjectively have any subjective expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers that they dial. Moreover, the Court deemed that society would also not objectively find
that an expectation of privacy in dialing phone numbers to be a reasonable one.33
Likening the pen register as a modern day equivalent to the early day switchboard
operator, the Smith Court relied on the concept of third-party doctrine in justifying their holding.
As Justice Blackmun commented, the Court has “consistently held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third-parties.”34
Applying that principle in Smith, the Court determined that when people, like Smith, whom
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voluntarily convey information to third parties, like a communications company, they expose
that information to the company’s equipment. As a result, people like Smith must assume the
risk that the communications company could reveal that information to law enforcement.35
Opposing the majority’s view in Smith, Justice Stewart believed that the use of the pen
register constituted a warrantless search. Relying on Katz, his dissent hinged on the presumption
the numbers dialed from a private telephone are the same as the conversations that occur during a
phone call, and therefore are within Fourth Amendment protection.36 Justice Stewart opined that
the phone numbers, while mundane in comparison to an actual telephone conversation, still
contain “content” that requires constitutional safeguards.37 In explaining his position, Stewart
doubted that people would be alright with the list of the phone numbers they dialed being
“broadcast to the world” because such a list could reveal the “identities of the persons and the
places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.”38
Justice Marshall also dissented in Smith and, like Justice Stewart, applied Harlan’s
privacy test in concluding that a legitimate expectation of privacy did exist in the dialing of
phone numbers. Marshall commented that the majority erred in applying Katz and the third party
doctrine to the facts of the case.39 Focusing on third party doctrine, Marshall opined that a
person is incapable of assuming the risk of disclosure by third parties to the government when no
realistic alternatives exist. Specifically, Marshall commented that “implicit in the concept of
assumption of risk is the notion of choice.”40 Without having the option of choice, therefore,
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Id.
Id. at 747.
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the government. This analysis is misconceived…” Id. at 478 (Marshall, T., dissenting).
40
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there can be no risk. So, applied to the facts in Smith, unless the defendant unrealistically chose
not to use the phone altogether, he had no choice but to accept the risk of government
surveillance.41
Justice Marshall called upon the Court to base the Katz expectation of privacy analysis,
not on one’s assumption of risk of disclosing to third parties but rather, on the risks one should
be forced to assume in a free society.42 Based on that perspective, and considering the crucial
role telephonic calls plays in our day to day lives, Marshall concluded that the expectation of
privacy test was satisfied and the government could not obtain the list of phone numbers absent a
warrant based on probable cause.43 Despite its conflicting views, the Court in Smith seemed to
be making headway in applying Katz’s expectation of privacy test to advancing methods of
electronic surveillance.
In 2001, the Court again addressed the interplay of advancing technology and privacy in
Kyllo v United States.44 In Kyllo, the government suspected a person, through the use of high
intensity heat lamps, was growing marijuana in his home.45 To confirm its suspicion, the
government positioned itself across the street from the suspect’s home and, by using a thermal
imaging device, determined that the suspect’s garage was “relatively hot” compared to the rest of
the house.46 Based on the thermal imaging results, the government obtained a search warrant
and found 100 plants growing inside the suspect’s home.47 The case was ultimately brought up
to the Supreme Court to address the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device and whether the
government’s use of that technology constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.
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Kyllo presented the Court with an opportunity to determine the limits on the “power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.48 Justice Scalia began the majority
opinion by underscoring a key point, stating, “It would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”49 Reiterating Harlan’s expectation of privacy standard from Katz, the Court found
that government’s use of the thermal imaging technology violated the suspect’s Fourth
Amendment rights. In response to concerns about future technological development, the Court
established a “bright-line” rule regarding government surveillance that was “not in public use.”
Scalia elaborated on this rule stating, “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area…constitutes a search - at least where the
technology in question is not in general public use.”
The majority opinion in Kyllo highlighted the Court’s concern about technological
development and its reluctance to open the door to certain types of warrantless searches. In the
end, the decision constituted a successful adaptation of the Katz approach to the digital world.
As Scalia commented, “reversing that approach (Katz) would leave the homeowner at the mercy
of advancing technology.”50 In Kyllo, the Court made a clear step forward in Fourth Amendment
law. It relied on the expectation of privacy rules of Katz and adapted those rules to “more
sophisticated systems” of surveillance.51 However, about ten years later, the Court would take a
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step in a direct direction in Fourth Amendment doctrine. In Jones v United States,52 the Court
shied away from the Katz standard and proceeded down a different privacy road.

In Jones, the Court unanimously concluded that law enforcement installing a GPS
tracking device on the underside of a criminal suspect’s car did qualify as a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment. However, the Court was sharply divided as to why it was a search. Many
in the legal community assumed that the Court would continue to apply the Katz expectation of
privacy test to determine if the four-week long GPS tracking by police constituted a search.
Switching course in its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court surprisingly reverted back to the
archaic trespass doctrine from Olmstead. According to the majority, by installing the GPS
device, there was a physical intrusion of private property for the purposes of obtaining
information.53 Due to the physical intrusion, the Court chose to bypass the Katz standard and
utilize the narrow, and all but abandoned, physical trespass standard. Justice Scalia explained
that the trespass test was the more appropriate test for the facts in Jones, and moreover, that
Jones’ rights should not solely depend on whether he reasonably believed his privacy was
violated.54
A key question resulting from the Jones decision was why Justice Scalia used the
Olmstead trespass test over the Katz expectation of privacy test. In explaining why the Court
switched back to the Olmstead test, Justice Scalia commented that the “Katz reasonable-

52

United States v Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
Id. at 946.
54
The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows that no search occurred here, since Jones
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we need not address the Government’s contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do
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expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.”55 However, that comment, squarely conflicted with Justice Stewart’s
comments in Katz.56 So, the question remains as to why Justice Scalia based the Court’s
decision on a supposedly abandoned privacy test. One can only speculate, but perhaps with the
country’s pervasive use and reliance on technology to communicate, Scalia may have felt
society’s expectation of privacy was eroding. Perhaps, with social media taking over the way
people interact, Scalia was concerned what privacy rights people now considered to be
“reasonable.” Along these lines, Scalia may have feared that the Katz test could no longer offer
Fourth Amendment protection. As a result, Scalia may have felt that the trespass doctrine of
Olmstead was needed to come back into the fray to help bolster the amendment. Whatever
Scalia’s motivation, it is abundantly clear today that technology is going to eclipse the narrow
holding in Jones as law enforcement can use methods such as OnStar or cell phone based GPS to
track people, without needing to make any physical contact with a car.57 Additionally, the
government can surveil people in other ways, including by monitoring Web traffic or phone or
credit card records.
The concurrence in Jones disagreed with Scalia’s rationale and opined that the Court’s
reliance on the trespass doctrine was unwise. Justice Alito, for example, concurred in the
majority's judgment but based his analysis on the Katz privacy test. Accordingly, Alito
categorized the issue in Jones not as an invasion of property, as Justice Scalia had, but as an
invasion of privacy.58
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Justice Sotomayor’s enlightening concurrence in Jones expressed a more expansive
approach to privacy issues.59 Sotomayor suggested that the government’s ability to obtain “at a
relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person”
required adapting and expanding the Katz expectation of privacy test.60 Sotomayor also
questioned, and took on the continuing viability of, the third party doctrine; a theory many
believe creates the largest gap in privacy protection, especially in the realm of technology. 61
Specifically, Sotomayor commented, “It may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties…This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People
disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers…”62
Condemning third party doctrine as applied to these technologies, she commented, “I for one
doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government
of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”63 Unlike
permissible third party search cases of the past, Sotomayor sought to emphasize the Court’s
attention of the copious and unparalleled amounts of information individuals disclose to
telecommunication companies and Internet service providers in the digital age.
In contrast to every other Justice in Jones, Sotomayor reasoned that evolving digital
technology had essentially changed the meaning of what “privacy” when myriads of personal
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Shaff, supra at 432.
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information and history can be preserved online, and can be easily collected by the government
in mass quantities.64 Her lone approach focused on whether the government’s ability to collect
so much personal information was enabling it to learn about a person's private affairs "more or
less at will."65 More than simply a single concurrence, Sotomayor “penned a legal manifesto on
privacy for a digital age debated among Fourth Amendment scholars and brandished by civil
libertarians seeking to prevent the coming of a digital government panopticon.”66

As the Kyllo and Jones decisions exhibited, the Supreme Court had begun to take on the
task as to how the Fourth Amendment applies in the digital world. Those cases also illustrated
the difficulties the Court has in determining how developing technology changes Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.67 In the subsequent years, the Court, and the legal community, has
continued to attempt to answer questions such as whether Internet users have Fourth Amendment
protection. One such attempt has been recently made by Orin Kerr, a legal scholar and professor
at George Washington University Law School. Kerr’s theories have helped create a general
framework that courts can utilize in applying Fourth Amendment safeguards and to determine
unreasonable searches and seizures to the Internet.68
Kerr’s approach addresses “the differences between the facts of physical space and the
facts of the Internet” and establishes guidelines for courts to “identify new Fourth Amendment
distinctions” in order to apply the amendment to a digital environment.”69 Cases like Olmstead,

Adam Serwer , How Sotomayor undermined Obama’s NSA, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-sotomayorundermined-obamas-nsa (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
65
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
66
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64

67

Shaff, supra at 425.
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Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1007
(2010).
69
Id.
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Katz, Smith, and Jones all dealt with issues of whether the government’s surveillance was done
“inside” or “outside” a constitutionally protected area. As the aforementioned cases showed, in
the physical world, the inside/outside distinction is paramount for Fourth Amendment search and
seizure analysis. Law enforcement, for example, must abide by the inside/outside distinction in
the physical world to determine what types of surveillance can be done with, and without, a
search warrant.70 As the Court in Katz held, the government does not need any probable cause or
warrant to conduct surveillance outside.71 Hence, so long as a person’s conduct is out in the
open, it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, in most cases, Fourth
Amendment safeguards are triggered when the government enters enclosed spaces like a home72,
an automobile73, or a sealed package.74 So, albeit a few clear exceptions, a person presumptively
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in “inside spaces.”75
In the physical world, the line between inside and outside is a crucial element in Fourth
Amendment doctrine as it ensures a proper balance between necessary government
investigations and personal privacy.76 In regards to the digital environment, however, there
arguably is no “outside.” Rather, everything about the Internet seems to be on the “inside”
where it is packed into wires and storage devices.77 As a result, Kerr contends that when facts of
criminal investigations switch to the Internet, the physical world “inside/outside distinction no
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longer works.”78 Therefore, different rules need to apply; and as Kerr explains, the Internet
consequently requires a separate distinction to “mirror the traditional physical distinction”
established by the Supreme Court.79
Additionally, in the physical world, there is a limit on the scale and location of
evidence.80 Physical evidence normally is limited to a specific location and, accordingly, Fourth
Amendment law takes into account those limits.81 These evidence limits make sense in a
physical world and over the years the Court has shaped the Fourth Amendment to coincide with
them. In the digital world, however, a very different dynamic exists.82 Unlike physical
evidence, Internet data has no limitations on where it can exist or where it can be stored. For
example, a typical Internet user might have multiple e-mail accounts, several social media
accounts, and several remote online storage accounts.83 The Fourth Amendment rules, therefore,
that make sense for evidence in the physical world cannot adequately govern Internet evidence.
New adapted rules are needed. Kerr suggests new rules in his approach to apply the Fourth
Amendment to the Internet.

78
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Attempting to translate and match Fourth Amendment established safeguards from the
physical world (i.e. Katz, Jones) to the cyber world, Kerr’s approach hinges on one main
concept. Kerr proposes to replaces the inside/outside distinction of the physical world with a
“content/non-content” distinction for the Internet.84 Referring to Katz, Kerr suggests that
Internet users should also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the “contents” of Internet
communications but not in “non-content” information.85 By using narrow comparisons between
the physical space and cyberspace, Kerr’s privacy application to the Internet articulates the
distinction between Internet “content” and “non-content.” Specifically, he suggests courts
should utilize the physical world privacy language and treat Internet “non-content” information
as if it was functionally on the “outside” and Internet “content” information as if it were
functionally on the “inside.”86 Under this framework, Internet surveillance of non-content
information would not trigger Fourth Amendment protections as physical world surveillance of
outside places does not presumptively trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Along these same
lines, Internet surveillance of content information would trigger the Fourth Amendment just as
physical world surveillance of inside places would presumptively trigger the Fourth
Amendment.87 Therefore, based on Kerr’s privacy roadmap, it naturally follow that Internet
inside content would be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, Internet
non-content would not be considered a search.
According to Kerr, the content/non-content distinction mimics the inside/outside
distinction to answer two key questions: 1. What is Internet content? and 2. What is Internet noncontent? Just as outside surveillance in the physical world generally relate to identity, location,

84
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and time, Internet non-content would also constitute surveillance related to identity, location, and
time.88 Additionally, just as inside surveillance in the physical world would seek to gather a
person’s “private thoughts,” Internet content surveillance would presumably convey a person’s
“private thoughts and speech.”89
With a content/non-content framework in place for the Internet, the courts then would be
tasked with drawing the line between the two to determine how the Fourth Amendment applies.
Using an analogy for postal mail, Kerr further describes Internet non-content as addressing (or
“envelope”) information and Internet content as what’s inside that “envelope”, e.g. the letter
itself.90 Like postal mail, the Internet deals with the sending and delivering of information.
Common examples are e-mail and instant messaging. So, under Kerr’s content/non-content
distinction, the non-content information would be the “to” and “from”, while content information
would be the actual message itself.91 According to Kerr, Internet content should include “the
substance of our thinking when we assume no else is around.”92 Moreover, it includes the
aspects of Internet use intended to be “hidden from those other than the recipients” for a
“specific person or even just to ourselves.”93 This vital distinction from non-content allows
people to use the Internet for individual purposes or to communicate with others without
government intrusion.

The technology of the Internet is evolving at a rapid pace. Despite this clear reality, the
courts have yielded only a few decisions dealing with the Fourth Amendment as it applies to
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Internet. Relying on past case law and Professor Kerr’s rubric, the next question raised should
be: “If Internet content triggers the Fourth Amendment, what exactly is Internet content?”
The Supreme Court attempted to tackle the Internet content/non-content distinction in
City of Ontario v. Quon.94 In this 2010 case, the Court set out to determine whether a California
police department violated the constitutional rights of an employee when it inspected personal
text messages sent and received by a city-owned pager. The case, which required familiarity with
the technology behind pagers, produced questions at oral argument which showed a shocking
lack of knowledge by the Justices in the area of the Internet.95
Perhaps it was a lack of Internet expertise, but the Court in Quon never reached the
narrow question of the appropriate level of Fourth Amendment protection for Internet content.96
However, the Court did infer that a person does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
text messages, even though they could be accessed by a third party (i.e. ISP).97 But the Court’s
hesitation in Quon to create an Internet content/non-content distinction for Fourth amendment
analysis left the Internet privacy question unresolved. In defense of the Court, this is a difficult
issue for the Court to resolve as different Internet applications (i.e. email, instant messaging,
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)) are unique in their own way, so the content/non-content
distinction therefore must also be unique for each specific mode of communication. With issues
unresolved, crucial questions remain open as to whether email subject lines, URLs, website IP
addresses should be protected as content or treated as non-content (envelope) information.98
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As a result of the Court’s reluctance to take on the Internet privacy issue, a major content
vs. non-content controversy continues regarding the privacy interests of web surfing information
(i.e. the IP addresses of websites and the URL addresses of the individual pages viewed.)99
Supporters of broad privacy protection have expressed concern that URLs contain content and
can reveal intimate personal information about web users.100 Others, conversely, interpret URLs
and IP addresses as non-content and rely on the third party doctrine to argue that they are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment, no matter what their content status.101 Most courts
addressing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the Internet have followed the holding
in Smith to delineate a clear bright line between content and non-content data102 Subsequently,
courts in the past have held that under third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to email addressing (envelope) information, such as IP and to/from addresses.103
For example, the Ninth Circuit tackled the Internet privacy question in 2008.104 In that
case, the court held that the government did not trigger the Fourth Amendment when it had a
suspect’s Internet service provider install a monitoring device that recorded the IP address,
to/from address for emails, and volume sent from the account.105 Notably, the court did
comment on what it considered to be Internet content. The Ninth Circuit tracked the reasoning
in Smith and held that the Internet surveillance in that case was “indistinguishable” from the use
of a pen register device in Smith.106 In regards to Fourth Amendment implications, the court
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considered IP addresses to be the Internet equivalent of telephone numbers. As a result, under
Smith, IP addresses were considered non-content and not protected by the Fourth Amendment.107
The Sixth Circuit, however, has applied a different Internet content/non-content
distinction and has held that Internet e-mail receives Fourth Amendment protection just as
telephone calls.108 The court explained that its holding was based on the current social role of
Internet communications.109 Although the opinion was later vacated on other technical grounds,
the Sixth Circuit did ultimately hold that a person “enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP”110
Therefore, under that rationale, the government cannot rely on the third-party doctrine from
Smith and “may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails
without first obtaining a warrant based on probable course.”111

With the Circuit Courts divided, and the Supreme Court seemingly reluctant to solve the
internet privacy question, Federal legislation concerning electronic surveillance is similarly
inconsistent and lacking. In response to Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”).112 Because Title III covered only the
interception of “wire” and “oral” communications rather than communications generally, the
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development of electronic communications created a gap in the statute. In 1986, Congress
sought to fill this gap with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). 113
By supplementing Title III, Congress implemented the ECPA to protect privacy interests
in the emerging realm of electronic communications.114 The ECPA was intended to extend
privacy rights to e-mail as well as create new protections for stored communications and stored
records held by third parties.115 At the time, many hailed the legislation as a victory for
privacy.116 But the ECPA was written back in 1986, before most people had computers at home;
before laptops, tablets and smartphones changed our lives; before social media and the World
Wide Web; and before most people even used email.117 Within a matter of years, however, the
Internet grew and the ECPA became the lone statutory framework for government surveillance
of Internet communications. In enacting the ECPA, Congress sought largely to align treatment
of electronic communications with Title III’s treatment of wire communications. But Congress
clearly failed to anticipate that technological developments which ultimately placed so many
electronic communications in the hands of third parties.118
While the ECPA provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in some ways,
it provides significant less protection in others.119 Whereas, under Smith, the Court afforded no
Fourth Amendment protection for non-content, the ECPA does gives an Internet user some more
privacy protection by requiring the government to first obtain a subpoena to obtain non-
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content.120 However, the ECPA provides less protection than the Fourth Amendment in several
other scenarios. Currently, under the ECPA, the government can access the following Internet
communications without a warrant: emails older than 6 months, digital address books and
calendars, direct Twitter messages older than 6 months, cloud storage documents, Facebook
messages and comments older than 6 months, private Facebook and Instagram photos, text
message older than 6 months, Dropbox accounts, and search queries.121 Many in the legal
community find the ECPA to be overly outdated because, back in 1986 , email service providers
did not store emails for very long after they were sent and read.122 In 1986, it was practically
inconceivable that a service provider would store email for more than 180 days. Therefore,
ECPA treated older email almost as if it were abandoned property, allowing a government
official to demand it from the service provider with a subpoena issued without a judge’s
approval.

The degree to which the Internet receives Fourth Amendment provides protection
remains an “open question” as “electronic communication via e-mails, text messages, and other
means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has been little explored.”123
With technological development seemingly outpacing judicial review and federal legislation, the
question as to whether a person has a reasonable expectation when using the Internet becomes
more pressing with each passing day.
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Last year, the Supreme Court moved Fourth Amendment doctrine a bit forward with
respect to cell phones, which are increasingly the primary way in which people access the
Internet. In Riley v California,124 the Court addressed the scope of the search-incident-to-alawful arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The Court
unanimously held that the search of digital content of cell (smart) phones does not fall within the
exception and, absent a warrant, any search would be unconstitutional.125 The Court reasoned
that cell phones “differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense” from other physical items
that are searchable incident to arrest.126 Given their “immense storage capacity,” Chief Justice
Roberts commented in the majority opinion that cellphones “could just as easily be called
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums,
televisions, maps, or newspapers.”127
The Court’s decision in Riley represents an important, albeit minor, development for
Internet privacy rights. While only in the narrow context of searches incident to arrest, the Court
moved the Fourth Amendment further into the digital world by addressing new privacy
challenges presented by technological developments.128 The holding requires a warrant to search
any data on a cell phone, regardless of whether that data is saved in the cloud (i.e. in online
servers managed by a hosting company), or on the phone’s internal hard drive.129 However,
outside of the search incident to an arrest context, the Court did not address whether information
stored in the cloud is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.130 The Court in fact went out of
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its way to clarify that Riley did “not implicate the question of whether the collection or
inspection of...digital information amounts to a search under other circumstances.”131
Nonetheless, the decision in Riley, while narrow in context, signals a potential shift in the
Court’s stance on third-party doctrine. Notably, Riley acknowledged the Court’s concerns with
the evolving technological landscape we live in as well as sensitivity towards user content and
privacy.
Additional discussion regarding third party doctrine in the digital age took place recently
in the DC Circuit. In Klayman vs Obama,132 a federal district court addressed the Government’s
bulk collection of telephone metadata (i.e. phone numbers dialed, date, and duration). The court
distinguished Smith and found that third party doctrine did not preclude Fourth Amendment
application. In its finding that a national security surveillance program constituted a warrantless
search, the DC Circuit concluded that the circumstances in Klayman was a “far cry” from the
analysis in Smith.133
Although the telephone data collected in Klayman was considered “non-content,” the
Klayman court emphasized the quantity and quality of the information collected in determining
that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed.134 Specifically, the court in Klayman found
several differences from Smith in reaching its conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation
took place. For example, unlike in Smith where one specific phone number was monitored,
Klayman implicated the telephone transactions for millions of U.S. citizens135 Also, the
government’s collection of metadata in Smith stemmed from an ongoing criminal investigation.
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In Klayman, however, the government, as part of its broad counterterrorism investigation,
monitored citizens “without any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.”136 Additionally, the
pen register in Smith was utilized for 2 weeks. The surveillance at issue in Klayman, however,
involved the collection of five years worth of data.137 In this regard, the court in Klayman added
that while metadata has not changed over time, the “ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered
the quantity of information that is now available and, more importantly, what that information
can tell the Government about people’s lives.”138 Here, the court addressed the non-content vs
content distinction and held that “people in 2013” had “an entirely different relationship with
phone” than those that lived back during the Smith case. The Klayman court suggested over the
course of five years, the content/non-content distinction begins to break down.139 In other words,
if the government can collect enough non-content (e.g. metadata), content can ultimately be
derived from it.
While the decision in Klayman was recently vacated due to a standing issue, the case has
significantly furthered the dialogue of the privacy rights in the digital age. Klayman called upon
the Supreme Court to reread Smith and reconsider third party doctrine by factoring in “present
day circumstances,” “the evolution of the government’s surveillance capabilities,” and “citizens’
phone habits.”140 To that end, in considering Klayman, the Court should conclude that the
precedent in Smith can no longer apply.141 Although Klayman addressed privacy rights solely in
the context of telephone use, perspectives from that case support a vision of the Fourth
Amendment being sensitive both to technological change and to context. Based on the rapidly
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expanding change in the digital world, the analysis in Klayman should ultimately extend to
Internet privacy rights as well.
The Internet privacy right issue has recently fueled an emerging debate over encryption.
Specifically, in response to demands from Internet users requesting higher levels of privacy and
security, companies like Google and Apple have been rolling out stronger “end-to-end”
encryption on their devices and services, such as iPhones and Gmail.142 End-to-end encryption is
a method of digital communication where the only the sender and recipient of a message have
access to it. The “end-to-end” promise means that messages are encrypted in such a way that
allows only the unique recipient of a message to decrypt it, and not anyone in between, not even
the Internet providers, i.e. Google and Apple.143
The encryption methods implemented by companies like Google and Apple have
arguably created a reasonable expectation of privacy for users of the Internet. Encryption offers
a much needed protection for users as their smartphones have become the modern day equivalent
of “digital homes.”144 This added privacy protection has gotten the attention of FBI and the
Department. Specifically, in the name of criminal and national security investigations, these
government agencies have insisted that Google and Apple need to provide them with “back
doors” to access private Internet communications.145
Providing backdoors to the government, however, as privacy and cryptology experts have
maintained, would be impossible without compromising the security of computer systems and
opening holes for criminals to exploit.

Nonetheless, the FBI and DOJ continue to put pressure
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on companies like Apple and Google to comply with their requests. The agencies contend that
end-to-end encryption poses an “every day” problem and an “insurmountable barrier” in
conducting surveillance. Yet according to a Federal Courts report on wiretapping in 2014, state
and federal law enforcement encountered only four cases all year (out of 3,554) in which
wiretaps were ineffective because of encryption.146 While it’s fair to acknowledge that, due to
encryption, the FBI and DOJ may have a diminished capacity to conduct some investigations,
it’s also fair to recognize that, at some point, an appropriate balance between safety, privacy, and
liberty must be struck.
As this paper is being written, Internet privacy rights are far from secure. The challenges
posed by the intersection of the Fourth Amendment, Federal legislation, and Internet surveillance
are not easy ones. The constitutional and statutory frameworks governing electronic surveillance
law developed at a time when electronic communications either did not exist or were not widely
used.147 The Internet and other technological developments have subsequently placed
tremendous strain on those frameworks.148 The essential elements of ECPA have not changed
since 1986, and the Supreme Court has failed to keep pace, saying remarkably little about the
Fourth Amendment’s application to new technology.149 Hence, the government can contend the
ECPA gives it the authority to ignore Internet privacy to an extent that would have “shocked the
framers of the Constitution.”150
While there is still significant work to be done, some progress has been made. Building
on the decisions in Katz, Smith, and Kyllo, recent cases like Jones and Riley have produced some
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clarification in the balance between electronic surveillance and privacy. Despite their differing
ideologies, Justices Scalia and Sotomayor have furthered the discussion in their own way to
frame the rules of searches and third-party doctrine; and to further clarify standards for
“reasonableness” and “expectation of privacy.” Similarly, scholars like Orin Kerr have
contributed by offering theories to adapt and modernize legal doctrine into the world of the
Internet and new technologies. Moreover, companies like Apple and Google have entered into
the Internet privacy fray by instituting encryption protection for their customers. In the end, time
will tell as to whether the Supreme Court and Congress can strike a fair and appropriate balance
between Internet privacy rights and transparency.
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